Strengthening Kenya's development strategy: opportunities and constraints by Killick, Tony
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecornmons.0rg/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
(832) 
(a) UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI 
(b/) Institute for Development Studies 
Discussion papers 
STRENGTHENING KENYA'S DEVELOPMENT 




DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 239 
INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY. OF NAIROBI 
P.O. BOX 30197 
NAIROBI, KENYA 
.. LIBRARY 
J 10 FEB 2011 ' 
"' '. . V 
INSTITUTE OF 
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
' CCT03E.R 19 76 
The author is grateful to Edgar 0, Edwards, Judith Heyer, William J. House, 
Rasmus Rasmusson and others for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and 
to A.M. Ole for assistance in preparing materials. 
Views expressed in this paper are those of the author'. They should 
not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Institute for.Development 
Studies, the University of Nairobi nor any other institution with which 
he is associated. 
IDS/DP 239 
STRENGTHENING KENYA'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: 




This paper develops a critique of the strategy of redistribution 
through growth' presented in the 1974-78 Development Plan in order to identify 
ways in which the strategy and policies could be improved for the future-
The internal consistency of the strategy is examined an<l "the adequacy of 
various of its key features is evaluated . Inferences are drawn about directions 
in which the strategy could be strengthened but it is suggested that 
adoption of some of these may not be politically feasible. The final sections 
therefore, looks at a strengthened strategy of redistribution through growth 
as an expression of political realities. It concludes that these realities 
impose considerable constraints on the feasibility of such a strategy, calling 




STRENGTHENING KENYA'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: OPPORTUNITIES 
AND CONSTRAINTS 
BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE 
The concept of 'redistribution through growth' has come strongly to 
the fore in recent writings on economic development."'" The essential feature 
of this development strategy is the notion that income inequalities (and 
the associated poverty and underutilisation of labour-) can be reduced by a 
policy of sustained, perhaps accelerated, overall growth of GNP combined 
with measures to ensure that the resulting increments to income accrue 
primarily to the poor. The main elements of such a strategy9 as presented 
in the literature, are as follows:-
(a) Sectoral priorities which particularly favour smallholder 
agriculture and rural and urban 'informal' activities; 
negatively, a lower-order priority for the development of modern 
industry and large-scale plantation farming. 
(b) Rural development linked to the increased emphasis on small-
holder agriculture, but a broader concept of integrated and 
simultaneous improvement in rural productivities and rural 
amenities. This aspect is commonly 13, jsJcgS to prescriptions for 
a decentralisation of planning. 
(b) Factoral priorities which favour labour-intensity and economise 
on the use of capital and foreign exchange, The adoption of 
mor^ . appropriate technologies is central to this aspect of the 
strategy. 
(d) Population restraint is also an integral part of the strategy 
in countries with rapidly expanding populations because of the 
close connection between population growth and poverty and 
unemployment. 
1. Chenery et al (6) contains the most comprehensive treatment of 
this strategy. This book is reviewed by Killick iri Eastern Africa 
Economic Review, June 1976. 
- 2 - IDS ./DP 239 
One of the most interesting features of Kenya's 1974-78 Development 
Plan (21) is that it was perhaps the first national plan to consciously 
adopt a version of this strategy, and it includes all the elements just 
listed. It is no accident that the planners should have adopted this type of 
strategy because the 1972 ILO report on Kenya (15) presented an early and 
influential version of redistribution through growth, and that report had 
an obvious impact on the thinking of the Plant's- authors. Although there is 
still continuity with earlier strategies, a significant change of emphasis 
is noticeable in the 1974-78 Plan, towards equity and employment objectives, 
and away from the pursuit of growth for its own sake. Compare the following 
quotations, the first from the seminal 1965 Sessional Paper on African 
Socialism and the second from the 1974-78 Plans-
(1) The ultimate objectives of African Socialism are 
clear. . . . The most important of these policies is to 
provide a firm basis for rapid economic growth. 
Other immediate problems such as Africanization of the 
economy, education, unemployment, welfare services, 
and provincial policies must be handled in WayS that 
will not jeopardise growth, (17, p. 18) 
(2) Improved income distribution and greater employment -
the primary objectives of this plan - can be achieved 
only if economic growth occurs at a greater rate than 
heretofore. (21, p„ 148; my italics) 
What follows consists of a critique of the Plan's strategy and 
policies, designed to indicate directions in which the strategy could be 
strengthened in future planning. Because the objective is to locate points 
of weakness, the paper does not pretend to offer a balanced evaluation of 
the Plan and should not be read as an attack on its authors. The plan is 
arguably the most interesting and professional to have been published 
in East Africa. That its positive virtues are not much discussed below 
is not due to a desire to carp but to identify ways of making further improve-
ments in the future. 
Since this paper relies heavily upon an analysis of the Plan, some 
justification is needed, bo4»h Because academics'.tend to take plan documents 
too seriously and because the oil crisis quickly rendered many of the Plan's 
targets and projections obsolete. However, this paper is mostly concerned 
with the ideas and policies in the Plan, rather than its numbers. And the 
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question of whether the Plan deserves to be taken seriously is implicitly 
treated in the final section of this paper. 
The section which follows identifies certain potential inconsisten-
cies in the strategy —• some general, some specific to Kenya — and looks 
at the extent to which they are guarded against in the Plan, The third 
section turns to examine the adequacy of the strategy and its policies 
in certain key areas; the size distribution of income, the regional 
distribution of income, technology choice, rural labour absorption, and 
population growth. The fourth section briefly summarises the inferences 
that can be drawn for future planning, bur the final section then takes 
up the question whether political constraints in Kenya are such that it 
is unrealistic to expect a strengthened strategy of redistribution through 
growth to be effectively implemented. 
QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 
Since Kenya's strategy of redistribution through growth is aimed 
at a number of goals - equity,, employment creation and accelerated growth, 
to say nothing of economic independence, external equilibrium,, and so on -
it is to be expected that inconsistencies or trade-offs may arise between 
them. However, once these tensions are recognised there is a good deal 
that policy-makers can do to reconcile the objectives, by sharpening 
their priorities and by the choice of multiple policy instruments which 
2 
avoid or minimise the incidence of goal conflicts. The danger that potential 
conflicts will become actualities is, therefore, strongly influenced by the 
extent to which the Tensions are acknowledged and policies chosen to 
minimise them. 
The position taken in this section is that there are a number of 
potentially important trade-offs which are insufficiently recognised in 
the Plan and which thus may undermine the strategy. These are briefly 
discussed in the following numbered paragraphs, 
(1) First, there are questions abort the quantity of saving and investment. 
Since the Plan states that the rich should bear proportionately more of the 
cost of the development effort (see below), the risk arises that this equity 
2. See Tinbergen (46) for a discussion of relationships berween 
objectives and instruments, 
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goal, if implemented, could diminish the incentives to save and invest, thus 
reducing the rate of capital formation and tending to slow the growth of the 
economy. This is a general point about redistribution through growth 
but may be particularly pertinent to the Kenya case because, according to 
data in the Plan, both business and personal saving are large relative to 
total saving, each contributing about two-fifths of the total. Depending upon 
how it were done, making the tax system more progressive would thus risk reducing 
the quantity of saving. There is, unfortunately, no discussion of this problem 
in the Plan, which, for example, projects personal saving to grow at 6.2 per 
3 
cent, or nearly as fast as the targeted expansion of GDP. In the absense 
of a recognition of this problem, it is impossible to be confident that a 
negative effect on saving would be minimised by the chosen tax instruments. 
Quite apart from possible disincentive effects via a reformed tax system, 
it could klso be that the greater emphasis in the Plan on rural investment 
and labour-intensive projects may reduced the quantity of investment because 
the novelty of this approach, and biasses against it in some of the implement-
ing agencies, may make it difficult to identify the new types of project 
in sufficient numbers. Again, the Plan offers no specific assurance against 
this possible trade-off between growth and equity, 
(2) The second issue concerns the productivity of investment. One of the 
attractions of redistribution through growth, with its emphasis' on labour 
intensity (implying higher productivities of capital) and the restructuring 
of investment towards the rural economy (where capital-output ratios may be 
smaller), is that it may reduce the overall capital-output ratio. This would 
help to counteract the historical tendency for the overall incremental capital-
output ratio to go up in Kenya.* However, there is no guarantee that this 
3. For saving data see the Plan (21) pp. 48-9, 169, The projected rate 
of personal saving is on p. 157. There is, of course, a hoary controversy 
about the effects of taxation on incentives to save and invest. For evidence 
from Africa that this may be a real problem see Bhatia (3) whose results 
suggest that about 80 per cent of a given marginal increase in the tax-GDP ratio 
is 'financed' out of private saving. 
4. It can be estimated from the national accounts that the gross incremental 
capital-output ratio* went up from an average of'2.71 iiTl968-70 to 3.16 in 
1971-73, using a one-year time lag. Estimates by the World Bank (51., p. 136) 
also provide evidence of a rising gross ratio. Surprisingly, their figures 
do not indicate lower ICORs in agriculture than for the economy as a whole 
and (p,137) they actually assume a lower IGOR in manufacturing than in 
agriculture. See also Powell (42, Table 14). 
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trend will be arrested and there are likely to be forces at work pulling 
in the wrong direction, in addition to the historical one, 
To illustrate: Hunt (13) and others have shown that it is the 
relatively wealthy and large farmers who are likely to be progressive 
innovators and it is they, indeed, who benefit proportionately the most 
from the agricultural extension services (see footnote 13 ). But 
redistribution through growth entails a reorientation of such services 
towards the poor smallholder, a fact which the plan recognises by stating 
that "Previous tendencies to concentrate attention on the more progressive 
farmers will be avoided", (21, p, 206) But to effectively reach large 
numbers of less progressive farmers could require a much enlarged invest-
ment of resources and, in the medium-term at least, may result in lower 
returns from these resources than with a 'progressive farmer' strategy. 
It would all depend upon the specific ways in which the extension policies 
were altered but these specifics are not spelled out in the Plan, perhaps 
because they had not been formulated,, So, once again, the danger of a 
trade-off remains„ 
Much the same can be said of special assistance to the less 
developed regions of the country: it is liable to be difficult and 
expensive. This (and an ambivalent government response) is brought out 
in the following passage from the Plan chapter on education (21, p. 412):-
During the 1970-74 Plan period the Government attempted 
to encourage primary education Tin remote areas / by 
providing boarding facilities at selected schools in these 
areas. The experience to date is that the cost per pupil 
has been extremely high and the actual response has been 
disappointing in terms of increased enrolment by people 
indigenous to these areas. Therefore, the Government will 
reduce the scope of this particular programme substantially 
until its effectiveness has been demonstrated. The Government, 
however, intends to test alternative means of promoting education 
in these areas,,s„However, it recognizes that its scarce 
resources must be utilised with maximum effectiveness. 
One of the unique features of redistribution through growth is 
that it envisages a shift of resources into the informal sector. Several 
writers (Leys, 34; Livingstone, 35; Kaplinsky, 16) have, however, expressed 
strong doubts about the dynamic potentialities of the informal sector, 
arguing that it is unlikely to generate much genuine entrepreneurial 
talent and that its progress isii]cely to be chiefly a function of the 
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development of the modern sector of the economy. Child (7) puts a contrary 
view, but if the pessimists are right the implication is .that large additional 
investments in the informal sector may have rather low returns9 to say nothing 
of the difficulties of preparing well conceived projects for this sector<, 
Overall, the Plan does not address this danger of less productive 
investment and postulates no change in the incremental capital-output ratio 
• 5 despite the historically rising trend, 
(3) As will be discussed at greater length shortly, the Plan states that a 
very iarge-soeie resettlement of smallholder farmers is necessary if further 
deteriorations in the employment situation are to be avoided. Here too 
care is needed to choose ways of achieving this which do not create a 
conflict between output growth and employment creation, because of the pro-
duction effect of converting large farms into smallholdings. It is not 
suggested that yields are necessarily lower on smallholdings - there is 
evidence to the contrary because of more intensive cultivation - but the 
fact is that half the total area under crops on large farms is now devoted 
to wheat and sisal, which are little grown on smallholdings because they 
7 
are believed best suited for large-scale cultivation. A larger area still 
is devoted to ranching, where again there are believed to be scale economies. 
Converting large farms for smallholder cultivation without reductions in 
output and efficiency would thus depend upon the careful formulation of 
policies to guard against this threats It would be necessary9 for example9 
to consider replanting land to crops better suited to smallholdingsa and to 
develop efficient small-scale techniques for wheat production and ranching. 
None of these things are impossible to achieve but they do require deliberate 
preparation. The Plan is silent on them. 
5. The ICOR implicit in the Plan is about 3.13, which may be compared 
with the 3.16 for 1971-73 reported in footnote 4, 
6. See Central Bureau of Statistics (27) for evidence of higher 
yields and lower unit costs on settlement farms. 
7 o Of the total acreage under principal crops on large farms in 
1974, 51 per cent was under sisal and wheat0 However9 less than a fifth 
of total large farm acreage was under any crops9 most of it being 
uncultivated meadows and pastures. See Statistical Abstract 1975 „ (24) 
tables 90 and 9l„ 
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(4) The Plan (21, p, 158) envisages substantial inflows of foreign private 
capital, continuing at a rare equivalent to about 10 per cent of total 
capital formation but increasing in absolute terms from £16=5 million in 
1972 to £28.0 million in 1978, Again, the question needs to be asked, whether 
this inflow is consistent with the government's equity objectives, since 
the managerial and technical personnel who come with the investment will 
naturally earn incomes which exceed average per capita incomes by very 
large multiples , and because of the profits earned, 
A possible response to this question would be for the planners 
to say that they are primarily concerned with the distribution of income 
among Keny ans so that the existence of rich non~Kenyans would not breach 
government objectives. Although this would be a sensible way of defining 
the equity objective, as a defence it would imply a somewhat naive view 
of the connections between foreign private capital and the distribution of 
income among Kenyans, Leys (35, p» 14-7), for example, concluded his 
examination of foreign capital in Kenya in the following terms:-
As for Africanisation, both of jobs and shareholding, 
although these were conceived of as measures for 
controlling the power of foreign capital, it was 
clear that they worked primarily to identify the 
government and the higher civil service more closely 
with the operations, interests and values of foreign 
capital. The results were monopoly profits, high 
rates of surplus transfer, low increases in employment 
and a falling share of wages in national income backed 
up by tight control over the trade unions. 
In similar vein, Langdon (32, Part.V) produces evidence of a symbiotic 
relationship between multinational corporations and the African elite in 
Kenya:-
The benefits of symbiosis are shared: in the form of 
resources for the state, which helps the dominant African 
class, with its dependence on the state for capital 
accumulation; in the form of direct resources for that 
class, through high salaries , directorships , shareholdings, 
partnerships, subcontracting opportunities and, the evidence 
suggests, some illicit favours; and in the form of bargaining 
advantages and market privileges for the mnc sector, based on 
the informal political influence symbiosis generates. 
So here too a potential trade-off is indicated between equity and the 
growth induced by foreign investment but it goes unacknowledged in the Plan. 
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It is not an inevitable conflict because progressive taxation could 
reconcile the two. Tax policies are discussed shortly, but Langdon's symbiosis 
implies that effective progressive taxation may be difficult to legislate 
and enforce, and there are also international constraints on the taxation 
of mnc profits . 
(5) As already suggested in the quotation from Leys, yet further possible 
goal conflicts are posed by the policy of Kenyanisation 9 which the Plan 
states should be brought to completion by 19 82, There are two possible 
trade-offs under this heading, one well recognised and one more subtle. The 
first is between employment creation, via Kenyanisation, and output growth. 
Given the already high cost of non-citizen labour, one would have to assume 
• ' 
a severe degree of irrational prejudice on the part of employers to deny that 
Kenyanisation is liable to result in some productivity falls in the short-
to medium-term. It seems likely that some such falls will occur as Kenya-
nisation progresses in the high-level labour force - a price which may 
well be worth paying but which nevertheless threatens the objective of 
accelerated growth. 
Second, there are the income distribution effects of Kenyanisation. 
The essential point here is that many of the remaining non-Kenyan workers 
are employed in high-level professional and managerial occupations - jobs 
g 
which normally attract the largest salaries. With very few low-level jobs 
still in non-Kenyan hands, the remaining rounds of Kenyanisation will thus 
be liable to worsen the size distribution of income among Kenyans. What 
is posed here, then, is the risk of a conflict between the goals of 
employment creation and economic independence, on the one hand, and reduced 
inequality on the other. Again this would not necessarily be an irreconcilable 
conflict. Incomes policies and progressive taxation could be mobilised to 
effect a reconciliation, but a prior condition is that the risk be recognised, 
8. The Statistical Abstract 19 75, (24, table 225) records 18,581 
non-citizens in wage employment in 1974. Of these 13,307 were classified 
as teachers or higher-level workers; 6,090, or about a third, were 
classified as 'professionals, directors, top-level administrators and 
general managers'. 
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whereas the Plan makes no mention of it, 
(6) A last point relates to factor proportions and income shares. There 
are a number of proposals in the Plan which are designed to change factor 
price relativities , raising the cost of capital vis-a-Vis labour, to assist 
employment creation. The Plan's discussion of incomes policy is set in 
this context; there is a proposal for increased taxation of imported capital 
g~ods; there is a hint (p. 183) that the structure of interest rates should 
be raised. (There has also subsequently been a devaluation, among whose 
effects have been a rise in the local price of imported capital goods.) 
Given the initial distortions in factor prices , this type of realignment 
is what could be expected from a plan which emphasises employment creation. 
But what will it do to the distribution of income? It all depends on the 
size of the elasticities of substitution: if they are generally smaller than 
unity, and constant, the effect of lowering the price of labou:- elative 
to capital will be to reduce the share of wages m otal national income and 
to raise the share of returns to capital, which tendency woulc. v.-. > likely 
9 
spill over into adverse effects on the size distribution of income 
Unfortunately, we do not have any comprehensive estimates of elasticities of 
substitution in Kenya, but Maitha's calculations for Kenya manufacturing 
in the mid-sixties produced a mean elasticity of ' 0,72.10 More recent, but 
less detailed, estimates by the World Bank, on the other hand, indicate 
larger elasticities in the modern sector."1"1 It is also possible that over 
9. Where Qk and and Q1 are the quantities of capital and labour 
employed and Pk and P.1 are their prices, the elasticity of substitution 
(s) is giv:?n by:-
S = A(Qk/Ql) ^ &(P1/Pk) 
Qk./Ql * Pl/Pk 
Since 0' Pk determines the share of capital receipts in total income and 
Q1 PI. determines the share of labour, when S <1.0 the increase in Q1 in response 
to a fall in PI will be too small to compensate "for the fall in PI so that 
the product Q1 PI will diminish. It is, however, impossible to predict 
the effects on inequalities Within either the wage earning or capitalist 
classes. Changes in those would add greater complexity to the overall outcome. 
10. See Maitha (37) table 2, The elasticity of 0,72 quoted is an 
unweighted mean -of the six industries for which Maitha calculated a value 
for S for two or more, years in the period 1963-66. 
11. The World Bank (51, pp. 127 8- 148) derives elasticities of about 
1,0 for manufacturing and 'other services' in 1964-70, and of 1.6 for commerce. 
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the longer term, if profits were reinvested in sectors and prdjec 
relatively large labour-capital ratios, there would be an increase.in the 
share of wages, although there is no assurance that ;this would happen'. . ".. 
The evidence is, therefore, inconclusive but the suggestion that alterations, 
in factor price relativities, while promoting employment, may have an 
adverse impact on the distribution of income is not one that should be 
ignored. Policies consciously chosen to guard against this danger would 
reduce the risk but this is not a topic discussed in the Plan. 
We will return briefly on pages 24 to 27 to consider the implica-
tions of the points made above for future development strategy. 
QUESTIONS OF ADEQUACY 
To keep the discussion within manageable bounds, discussion of the 
adequacy of the Plan's proposals will be confined to five issues that-can be 
regarded as central to an effective strategy of redistribution through 
the size distribution of income; ..v.-:..----. -ffWV* 
the regional-distribution of income; 
Cc] the choice of technology, • • .^r'•• '' 
(d) rural labour absorption; .-'.-' 
Ce) population growth. '.'••'.-''f'''-"! •' 
Each of these topics will be discussed in relation to the initial gravity of 
the problem confronted, the likely impact of the policies in question, ana 
the speed with which their impact may be felt. 
The Size Distribution of Income 
One of the disadvantages suffered by the authors of the T.LO report 
and the Plan was a dearth of hard data on key variables such as the magnitude 
of the employment problem, the incidence of poverty, and so on. One such gap 
was the absence of estimates of the size distribution of income in Kenya,, 
but an estimate has since become available by a World Bank staff member, whose 
principal results are reproduced in Table 1. It would be unwise to treat 
the results in Table 1 as being more than first approximations. A variety 
of assumptions and estimating procedures had to be employed by the author, : 
who was using secondary sources rather than primary research data,. If only 
because they reveal a rather extreme degree of inequality, the estimates may 
• ' ••sJlSBiK 
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Table 1. Estimated size distribution of income in Kenya, 1969.c 





(1) (2) (3) 
1st 1.8 1.8 157 
2nd 2.0 3,8 174 
3rd 2 „ 6 6,4 226 
4th 3.6 10,0 ~ - . 3 1 3 
5 th 4.0 14,0 348 
6 th 4.5 18.5 . 392 
7th 5.2 23,7 453 
8th 8.3 32.0 , .723 
9 th 11.7 43,7 1,018 
10th 56,3 100,0 4,901 
Average - - 871 
Analysis of 10th decile:-
Bottom 5% 12,0 - 2,090 
Top 5% 44.3 - 7,715 
Top 2%':a 29 o0 - 12,614 
Top 1% 3 18,5 — 16,16 8 
Notes: a. Estimated from Lorenz curve by Killick. ; 
b. Per capita GDP at factor cost in current prices. 
Co The Gini coefficient for this distribution is 0.60. 
Source: for cols, (l) and (2), Morrisson (39). 
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be biassed in that direction, especially if one takes into account the 
ameliorating effects of transfer payments arising under extended family and 
other traditional obligations. On the other hand, the author is highly expert 
in this field and believed that Kenya offered favourable conditions for estimating 
income distribution. His findings are broadly consistent with the results of 
12 
other studies and the usual exclusion of capital gains from the definition of 
income tends to understate inequalities rather than the opposite. 
We see from Table 1 a highly skewed distribution of income, with 
the poorest 50 per cent of the population receiving an estimated 14 per cent 
of total income and the richest 10 per cent obtaining 56 per cent of total 
income. Less than 20 per cent of the population is shown as receiving incomes 
equal to, or greater than, the mean per capita income (a fact which gives added 
weight to oft-repeated warnings on the dangers of using per capita income figures 
And, at 0.60, the Gini coefficient is at the upper end of the scale of values 
generally obtained for this coefficient from income distributions. 
So an assessment of the adequacy of the Plan's proposals to improve 
the size distribution of income has to start from initially severe degrees of 
inequality. It also has to be assessed in the light of the existence of 
forces at work tending to perpetuate the inequalities, with the rich acquiring 
accumulations of income-earning wealth; converting their economic advantages 
into political power which can, in turn be used to increase their economic 
advantages; buying superior educations (and hence future earning power) for their 
Children; and so onT On the other hand, the large initial inequalities can also 
12. Adelman and Morris (1) estimate shares going to the poorest 60 per 
cent and the richest 5 per cent similar to the Morrisson results. Figures in the 
IL0 report (15, Table 25) are also broadly consistent with Morrisson's estimates, 
13. Kinyanjui (31) for example, finds considerable stratification among 
Kenya's schools and that "the inequalities among schools in most cases benefit 
the economically powerful groups in the country". More specifically, he finds 
that "the economic capacity of the parents is becoming crucial in determining 
who benefits from provision of elementary education and how far a pupil goes 
up the educational ladder", (p. 39) Hyden's (14) conclusions on the operation 
of co-operatives also point to ways in which wealth can be used to perpetuate 
inequalities. These include, (a) that "co-operative goals are subordinated in 
the interest of specific groups..." (p.89); (b) that among the problems of co-' 
operative management "is the persistence in the rural areas of strong primary groups, 
whose objectives run contrary to the principles implied in the formal structure of 
marketing co-operatives..." (p. 108); (c) that "concern about maximum return to all 
members is not very strong among co-operative leaders and staff.... Union or society 
funds are used for purposes that are contrary to the economic interests of the 
ordinary producer-members" (p. 123); and (d) that many people take the view that 
'co-operatives are for people with money' and are used as a means of control by the 
rich. (p. 14-2) Leonard ("33) provides an example in which government services are 
tending to perpetuate inequalities. Studying agricultural extension services in 
the Western Province, he found that the 10 per cent 'progressive' farmers (who were 
also the more wealthy) received 57 per cent of total extension service visits, 
while the 4-7 per cent of non-innovators received only 6 per cent of visits. He 
found a similar, but less marked, tendency for the veterinary extension service. 
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be viewed as providing an opportunity , fors with so much income concentrated 
among the richest five to ten per cent, there is a large potential gain to 
be had from conventional fiscal measures of 'static' redistribution. 
Viewed against this background, the present strategy for 
achieving greater equality seems inadequate. First, the whole emphasis 
in this area is on 'dynamic' redistribution, i.e. ensuring a better 
distribution of future increments to income. It is a danger of redistribution 
through growth that it may, consciously Qr unconsciously, serve to divert 
attention from the desirability of also striving for some static redistribution. 
This may appear an unfair criticism of the Plan, which does state (p, 3) that 
"the better-off members of the community will contribute proportionately more 
to Government revenue through taxation" and refers (p. 167) to the need 
for larger government revenues "through an increased elasticity of a reformed 
tax system". However, the need for reform is regarded in the Plan (pp. 168-9) 
as; having been satisfied by tax changes already introduced in the 1973 budget, 
when the graduated personal tax was abolished, the sales tax introduced and 
various improvements made to the income tax. In consequence, an essentially 
unchanged structure of taxation is projected, with receipts from personal 
income tax expected to increase only at 3.3 per cent annually in 1972-78. 
14 (See also page ,35 below.) 
Given the large initial inequalities and Westlake's findings that, 
prior to the 1973 changes, the structure of ta:: payments had a neutral or 
15 
regressive effect on the distribution of personal incomes, the Plan's 
proposals are unlikely to bring reasonable improvements in the medium-term. 
(See also Thimm, 45.) 
14. See Plan (21, p, 156) which projects direct taxes on households 
as rising from £30.6mn. in 1972 to £37.4mn, in 1978. For detailed revenue 
projections see p, 169, 
15, Westlake (49) studied: the impact of direct and indirect taxation 
in Kenya in 1970/71, He concluded that:-
in the absence of tax evasion the overall tax structure over 
household income ranges up to shs. 2,000 per month is at 
best neutral and at worst regressive ,,, above shs. 2,000 per 
month . „ . overall taxation does become1 progressive. However, 
less than 1 per cent of the African population fall into this 
high income range, (p, 19) 
But he also found widespread tax evasion,, especially among the highest 
income brackets, which effectively removed the progressivity' at the 
upper end and left' the overall structure mildly regressive, (See his 
table 11, lines 9 and 10,) 
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The Regional Distribution of Income 
While the planners could in 1973 plead ignorance of the size distri-
bution of personal incomes, they could not use that defence with respect 
to regional inequalities. There is admittedly a dearth of published regional 
data on the distribution of economic activity in Kenya, but the ILO report 
was able to assemble sufficient data to show that large disparities existed 
between various parts of the country. Further information has since become 
available and some of the chief indicators are summarised in Table 2 below. 
The first four columns provide indicators of relative development 
by province. Column (1) relates formal sector wage employment to total 
labour force; column (2) reproduces recently available statistics on the 
location (not place of registration) of motor vehicles, per thousand of the 
population; column (3) reproduces Heyer's estimates of marketed agricultural 
output per capita; and column (4) shows average earnings per wage worker, 
expressed as a percentage of the national average. Large inequalities are 
apparent in each case, although the figures conceal the additional fact 
16 
that there are big intra-province differences. Nairobi, of course, 
emerges as the most highly developed region, and the Nyanza, Western and 
North Eastern Provinces as relatively underdeveloped. The size of the 
differences between the various provinces invites an obvious conclusion: 
that regional disparities are part of Kenya's problem of inequality, This 
was an important aspect of the initial situation confronted by the planners. 
It was also, as the ILQ report pointed out, a problem that was being 
reinforced by the existing pattern of government spending. (15, pp. 78-81 
and 300-303) A specific illustration is given ii> column (5) of Table 2, 
which relates the availability of hospital beds to province population size; 
the point is more generally illustrated by the data on total government 
spending per capita in column (6), Exactly the same pattern emerges 
as from columns (1) to (4): Nairobi is disproportionately the most favoured 17 
region, and Nyanza, Western ai>d North Eastern are the least favoured. 'If 
we take column (2) as providing the most general indicatp? of relative 
16. See source of column (3). See also Nyangira, (41, table IV, 
p. 47) and ILO, (15, Table 28). 
17. An estimate by Singer and Reynolds, (44) of a population-adjusted 
in4ex of service availabilities indicates rankings very similar to those 
in cols. (5) and (6). 
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developments reflecting both agricultural and formal-sector activities, 
we find a Spearman's rank coefficient of correlation between columns (2) 
and (5) of 0,81 and between (2) and (6) of 0.93, 
This evidence of a close association between government spending 
patterns and regional inequalities is strongly consistent with the findings 
of other studies. The most important of'these is Nyangira's investigation 
of relative modernisation and public resource allocation, (4-1) He found 
a strong statistical relationship, at the district level, between the level 
of modernisation and the allocation of public resources - a relationship, 
he suggests, which runs causally from the former to the latter. Less power-* 
ful but still significant, he found resource allocation to be statistically 
(and causally, in his view) associated with certain political variables, 
the most important of which was the number"of ministers and assistant 
ministers originating in each district. A 1974 study of the distribution 
of educational resources by Kinyanjui points in the same direction, conclud-
ing (31, p. 39) that "educational benefits are being distributed in favour 
of the economically and politically powerful districts and provinces". 
To sum up, we have seen there to be large and systematic inequalities 
in the regional distribution of economic activity and that past patterns.of 
government spending have tended to reinforce these inequalities. The obvious 
policy implication is that an adequate strategy for improving the distribution 
of income would have to incorporate regional policies designed to mitigate 
these inequalities and to reverse the tendency for government spending 
patterns to aggravate the inequalities, but there is an almost complete 
absence Of regional policies from the Plan. There is no chapter in it 
which deals specifically with the regional problem, few regional data are 
presented and there are virtually no regional targets. This neglect represents 
a clear retreat from earlier positions. For example, one of the chief ILO 
• recommendations in this area was that .the/government, should set regional 
• quotas (maxima for Nairobi and minima for the neglected regions) for 
education, other government services and for civil service recruitment. 
The initial government response to these recommendations was positive:-
The Government is aware of the fact of regional 
inequalities in the distribution of welfare, services 
and amenities.... The Government accepts that geographic 
quotas are probably necessary for a variety of services, 
activities and programmes.... Current planning practices 
and procedures will be examined with a view to introducing 
geographic quotas for a variety of services and amenities 
and for expenditures during the next _/l974-78 7" Plan period. 
(20, paras. 242-43) 
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However, these aspirations find little reflection in the Plan. There 
are no geographical quotas for education and other social services, nor 
for overall government spending, nor for civil service recruitment. 
There is, it is true, a commitment to the establishment of District Develop-
ment Committees (but only with grants of £25,000 p.a.). This commitment 
is being implemented and their funds have since been increased. But these 
Committees are not set within the framework of a strategy for reducing 
geographical disparities and could, indeed, help to perpetuate them. It is 
also not clear that they represent a genuine decentralisation of planning, 
as often advocated in a strategy of redistribution through growth, for 
final approval of spending by the District Committees remains with Nairobi. 
In the area of industrialisation there also appears to have been 
a retreat from regional policy, for while the 1970-74 Plan did, at least 
on paper, articulate an industrial location policy designed to "widen 
the geographical dispersal of the benefits of industrialisation", the 
18 1974-78 Plan is largely silent on this subject. 
In this field of regional policy, therefore, the Plan's strategy 
must be judged inadequate. It gives no reason for expecting a significant 
decrease in the extent of regional disparities, nor does it even give grounds 
for believing that the pattern of government spending will stop reinforcing 
these disparities. 
The Choice of Technology 
There appears to have been agreement between the authors of the 
ILO report and the government that too.often in the past choices of 
productive techniques have not been well suited to local conditions, > " 
especially in their bias towards capital intensity. (see 20, paras. 106-115) 
In the brief outline of redistribution through growth at the beginning of 
this paper the adoption of more appropriate technologies was mentioned as 
an integral part of the strategy, and the discussion on questions of 
internal consistency indicated at a number of points why this is likely 
to be of critical importance in avoiding some of the goal conflicts discussed 
there. Thus, the danger that a restructuring of investment so as to primarily 
18. Compare the 1970-74 Plan (18), chapter 10 (especially pp. 324-27) 
with the 1974-78 Plan (21),chapter 12. This latter has no section dealing 
with location policy, although it does contain proposals for encouraging 
rural industry. 
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benefit the poor may result in reduced productivities of capital would 
be diminished if the relevant type of technology, e.g. for use in the 
informal sector, were already available. Similarly, the danger that the 
resettlement of smallholders on formerly large farms would result in 
output losses could be minimised if improved cultivation techniques were 
already available for profitable adoption by smallholders. Lastly, the 
risk that altering factor price relativities may have adverse effects 
on the distribution of income would be reduced if alternative labour-
intensive techniques were known and available; the elasticity of sub-
stitution is likely to be very sensitive to knowledge of alternative 
technologies. 
But if the adoption of more appropriate techniques is crucial 
to the strategy, it is.also a difficult area for national policy makers 
to operate in effectively. So far as Kenya is concerned, the Plan's chapter 
on technology makes two principal proposals. The first is to implement 
a proposal made in the previous plan to set up a National Council for 
Science and Technology. This is given fairly wide terms of reference but 
would be essentially advisory in character, with only limited resources 
of its own. At the time of writing, however, it has still not been 
19 formally established. 
The second chief policy proposal is that the government should 
increase its own expenditures on research and development - from an 
equivalent of 0.91 per cent of GDP in 1971 to 1.0 per cent in 1978. 
It may be doubted whether the necessary improvements in technology 
can be bought with 0.09 per cent of GDP. Various other proposals in this 
area by the ILO report which were at the time accepted by the government 
are absent from the Plan. But perh ps most disquieting of all, the Plan's 
chapter 8 on technology is not written around the tb.eT,e of appropriate 
technology at all and therefore does not place any particular emphasis 
on the needs of the informal sector, or smallholders, or of semi-arid 
farming areas, or for labour-intensity. Thus, while admitting that 
19. In July 1976 the government introduced a bill into Parliament 
which would have set up the council with an annual budget of only £56,000. 
M.P.s were, however, critical of such a large sum and, especially, of 
an alleged preponderance civil service Permanent Secretaries on the 
proposed council. In the face of these criticisms the government withdrew 
the bill for a six-month 'cooling-off period'% (See issues of the Daily 
Nation and the Standard, Nairobi, of 16 July 1976.) 
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this is a difficult policy area, it is nevertheless hard to believe that 
the rlan proposals are either adequate to the itip'crrTianSesof the subject 
or go as far as they could. 
Rural Labour Absorption 
The Plan (21, p, 4) provides employment projections which envisage 
a 21 per cent increase during 1972-78, or an annual growth of 3,2 per cent. 
The urban informal sector is proj ect'ed to absorb additional labour at the 
fastest rate (7.5 per cent), but it is necessarily the rural economy that 
must absorb the largest absolute number - 695,000 out of a total expansion 
of 1,122,000. It is therefore not surprising to find it claimed a few 
pages later that. 
In order to achieve the employment goals set out in 
this Plan, it is estimated that 350,000 new agricultural 
smallholdings must be created by 1978, To achieve this 
the Government will redefine the size of all co-operative 
and low-density settlement schemes, and the criteria for 
land ownership „ „... (21, p, 8) 
20 
Thus, the initial situation was one of substantial un- and under-employment, 
a rapidly growing labour force, an inability on the part of the modern 
sector to solve more than a modest part of this problem, and a consequential 
necessity for smallholder agriculture to bear a great deal of the burden. 
A clear implication of the Plan paragraph just quoted is that re-
settlement programmes will be a central feature of policies to increase 
rural labour absorption, but it is worth, pausing to consider the implications 
of the target of 350,000 new smallholdings, The figures below set out 
estimates of the total area of arable land that would be required for 350,000 
new smallholdings on three alternative assumptions. The first.is that 
new settlements would be the same average size as under past resettlement 
schemes, namely 12,4 hectares. The second assumes an average size equal to 
those specifically proposed in the Plan, namely 10 hectares. The third 
assumes the new smallholdings would be of the same size as the 1969 national 
20. Landlessness is an important aspect of this, Mbithi (38, p, 201) 
confirms the rough estimate in the ILO report of about 300,000 landless 
migrants in 1969 and suggests that this number is growing at about 15,000 
per annum. This implies a total of about 400,000 landless in 1976, 
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average for all smallholdings, namely 3.4 hectares „ The total area 
required under these three assumptions is: -
000 hectares 
Assumption 1 4340.0 
Assumption 2 3500.0 
Assumption 3 1190,0 
So, depending upon the chosen assumption, a total area of between 1.2 and 
4.3 million hectares of arable land would be required. Now compare this 
22 with the following data on the area under large farms in 1973:-
000 hectares 
Total area 2547,7 
of whichs-
under crops 440,8 
under major crops 
commonly grown on 
smallholdings 173,9 
Thus, if it were taken seriously, the implications of a resettlement 
of even a significant proportion of the 350,000 smallholders on existing 
large farms are enormous- the more so because many of the 'large farms' are 
co-operatives, or multi-partnerships, or companies involving large numbers 
of cultivators. Perhaps no more than a fifth of the large-farm area is 
under single ownership and thus potentially able to absorb a large incre e 
2 3 in the number of cultivators. Single ownership would have to be virtually 
21. These average areas are computed from data provided in the Plan, 
(21, chapter 10) and the ILO report (15, table 3, p. 36), 
22. Source: Statistical Abstract 19 75 , (24)s tables 90 and 91, We 
may also compare the areas resulting from the 350,000 target with the 
official estimates of the total national area of high-potential land of 
6.8 million hectares and of medium-potential land of 3,2 million hectares. 
(24, table 76) Most of this is, of course, already farmed, 
23. Data on land transfers in the Trans Nzoia District in 1964-69, which 
are thought to be fairly representative of the national picture, indicate 
that of the total area transferred 53% was farmed by multi-partnerships, 
9% by co-operatives, 17% by companies and 21% by single owners, (c.f. Heyer 
et al, 10, p. 240) 
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eliminated for the large farms to be able to make a significant contribution 
to rural labour absorption, although it may well be that the co-operatives, 
24 partnerships and companies could also absorb higher densities. 1 
However, if they turn to the chapter in the Plan dealing with 
agriculture and resettlement the large farmers can breath again. For there 
is no mention in it of the 3 50,000 target; the only specific provision in 
the Plan for new resettlements is for a total of 18,000 holdings, 14,000 
under the Shirika programme and 4,000 from state lands. (21, chapter 10, 
especially pp. 225-30) Moreover, nothing further has been heard since the 
publication of the Plan of its commitment to "redefine the size of all 
co-operative and low density settlement schemes, and the criteria for land 
, . a n a 
ti./ndrsnip;'. In the absence of alternative proposals in the agriculture 
chapter to meet the 350,000 target, one is forced to the conclusion that 
there is no coherent land policy in the Plan. 
In fact, the information set out here makes it seem most unlikely 
that resettlement on large farms could make more than a secondary contribution 
to the absorption of rural labour. Most would have to be absorbed by the 
sub-division of existing smallholdings and by movements on to land hitherto 
ccnsi^eter marginal. This carries strong implications for the desirability 
of policies to develop cultivation practices that will permit more intensive 
land use without adverse effects on soil and yields, and for successful 
farming in semi-arid or drought-prone areas. The absence from the Plan of 
adequate proposals in these directions and of convincing land policies 
implies that, if its employment projections are even approximately correct, 
the already large problem of landlessness (see footnote 20) is doomed to 
worsen. 
Population Growth 
Because of its close connection with the incidence of poverty and 
unemployment - to say nothing of its effects on the growth of per capita 
income - it was suggested early in this paper that policies to prevent rapid 
population expansion are to be regarded as an important aspect of redistribution 
'in.- ;i:Yv • 
24, The 350,000 target may also be compared with the total number of 
55 ,000 to 60,000 families resettled in the entire post-independence period 
(estimated from Plan chapter 10). 
- 25, The ILO report proposed a ceiling on the amount of land which an 
individual may own but the government did not comment on this in the Sessional 
Paper on Employment, (20, p. 34) 
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through growth. The Plan (21, pp„ 99-102) seems to take a similar view 
for Kenya. It points out -chat the rate of population expansion has been 
accelerating during the last quarter-century, rising to the very rapid 
3.5 per cent per annum in 1969-74; it draws attention to the existence of 
a child dependency ratio greater than one; to high densities on the most 
fertile land; and to a close connection between these trends and the 
employment problem. It reproduces alternative population projections amply 
demonstrating the great problems that a continuation of these trends would 
igsrealbe f crcthe future, and the benefits to be derived from reduced growth. 
Thus rapid population growth appears to be identified as a foremost 
economic problem - until one turns to the two paragraphs which the TrMft 
devotes to the policy response to this problem. (21, paragraphs 3.58 and 
3.59) The first of these summarises the components of the then existing 
family planning programme; the second, which consists of two short 
states the cost of the programme in the plan period to be K£10.8 million. 
In effect, the Plan announces that past programmes are to be continued, the 
implication being that these will be sufficient to cope with the problems 
just summarised. There are, unfortunately, reasons for doubting whether 
a contin>;,iV J on of past policies would be an adequate response. Consider 
the following:-
the rate of population growth has continued to accelerate since the 
adoption of an official population policy in 1S67; 
- there are high drop-out rates: Gachuhi (8) found that as many women 
drop-out of the programme as are newly recruited in any given month, 
with 82 per cent of women using contraceptive methods other than the 
IUD having dropped out within one year of entering the programme; 
only about 3 per cent of women of reproductive age are employing 
26 contraception through the family planning programme; 
even though the great majority of women are still not reached by tie 
2-'. This estimate is taken from Bondestam, (4), p. 34, updated by 
the author to 1974, 
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27 programme, its rate of expansion has slowed down dramatically; 
r\ Q 
costs per acceptor are very high;^ 
- the targets for trained family planning personnel presented in the Plan 
29 imply highly unfavourable ratios of staff to the population at risk. 
In fairness, it should be added that since the Plan was written 
the government has reached agreement with the World Bank on a family 
planning programme for 1974-78 with ambitious targets. This has, however, 
so far been unable to arrest the 'deceleration revealed in footnote 27, with 
new acceptance rates running at only about two-fifths of the target (25, 
p. 162), so it remains uncertain whether this new programme can overcome 
the weaknesses referred to above. It is not clear that it is set in the 
framework of a long-term demographic strategy, there apparently remains 
ambiguity about whether the policy is health oriented or development 
oriented, senior members of the implementing agency (the Ministry of Health) 
remain unconvinced of the desirability of a population policy, too much of 
the impetus has come from external aid agencies leaving the position of the 
government rather ambivalent, and family planning publicity remains notable 
by its absence. 


























Source: Statistical Abstract 1975, (24), table 191. 
28. Bondestam, (4), p. 34, estimated the cost-per-acceptor in Kenya to 
be $31 in 1969-70, which figure can be compared with a median for 18 other 
LDCs in 1969 of $14. (See World Bank, 50-4 p. 208.) 
29. According to the staff targets in the Plan, there would be one trained 
family planning worker for roughly every 4-,350 women of reproductive age, 
compared with a median ratio of 1:833 quoted for a large sample of LDC's 
in 1968. (Berelson, (2), p. 361). 
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Certainly for the Plan, and most probably in terms of subsequent 
moves, it seems reasonable to categorise family planning policies as quite 
inadequate. 
APPARENT IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PLANNING 
To repeat, the foregoing criticisms should not be read as an attack 
on the Plan and planners. The plan has yet to be written which could not be 
substantially criticised, for they are written in a second-best world and 
their authors operate within often severe constraints. Nor should what has 
been written be interpreted as rejecting the basic strategy of redistribution 
through growth for Kenya. In.fact, the decision to adopt such a strategy 
was an important step forward. Rather the intention has been to probe for 
weaknesses in the strategy in order to identify directions in which it could 
be improved for future planning. 
It is not too difficult to draw some inferences from what has been 
said. One is that the various potential inconsistencies and trade-offs 
between the government's development objectives should be more explicitly 
recognised, that multiple policy instruments should be selected to minimise 
the risk of conflict, and that priorities should be set between objectives 
so that rational choices can be made in the face of uEr-a&oidaH® goal' 
conflicts. More specifically, the planners should give a fuller consideration 
to the -Jifct'*' that the pursuit of employment and equity does not necessarily 
pull in the same direction as accelerated (or even sustained) economic growth. 
The apparent implications of the analysis for future planning are 
similarly obvious when it comes to those aspects of the strategy which are 
criticised above as inadequate: if they are inadequate strengthen them. 
This implies, among other things, a direct assault on.the extremely skewed 
size distribution of income; the formulation of policies of regional equali-
sation; a more coherent approach to land ownership and labour absorption 
in agriculture; a more dynamic population policy. 
To proceed to a lower level of generality, a variety of specific 
suggestions could be made which might help remedy the weaknesses identified. 
It has already bo-en suggested, for example^ that the strategy on technology 
is inadequate and that more convincing policies in this area could (a) 
reduce the dangers that a restructuring of investment in favour of the poor 
and of labour-intensity may result in reduced productivities of investment, 
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(b) reduce a possible trade-off between agricultural production and a 
shift to smallholder cultivation, ar.a (c) reduce the threat that altering 
factor prices in favour of labour-intensity might worsen the size 
distribution of income. This would involve a larger and mere dynamic 
technology programme than that announced in the Plan, including a re-
examination of ILO proposals that have since been lost sight of. Insti-
tutions that could comb the experiences of other developing countries and 
of the most recently 'developed' countries would be desirable, to see what 
could be learned from them and to arrange technical assistance from these 
sources. In the field oF agriculture, an adequate technology policy would 
necessitate a conscious re-ordering of the country's considerable research 
capacities away from its bias towards large-fanner problems and towards the 
30 
interests of the smallholders - into work on the development of disease-
and drought-resistant (and hence risk-minimising) food varieties, economical 
methods of small-scale ranching, smallholder land conservation, and so on. 
The adoption of a more progressive (less regressive) tax system 
has emerged as an important recommendation at several points and one with 
a substantial potential given the concentration of income in the richest 10 
per cent. This would not only make a direct contribution to the equity 
objective but would.also help to rec ic; the tensions between the objectives 
of an improved income distribution, on the one hand, and the pursuit of 
Kenyanisation and foreign private investment, on the other. What is needed 
is to capture for Kenya the progressivity that has been found to exist in 
Tanzania's tax system- (Huang, 12) One avenue which suggests itself here 
is to redress the failure to tax wealth, for example through the taxation of 
31 land and more stringent taxation of urban property, 
30, Given the apparently nigh priority attached to agricultural research 
in Kenya, the results for small farms have been disappointing 
This tends to be the case particularly in the medium and low potential 
farming areas. It is also true that research has been concentrated 
on the high value cash crops rather than foods, with the exception 
of maizej wheat and dairy products which were the mainstay of the 
European mixed farms0,,.Research still tends to emphasise large rather 
than small farm needs, (Heyer and Waweru in 10, pp. 203-4) 
31. Chelliah et al, (5) give the following figures of taxes on property 
as a percentage of total tax revenues, using means for 1969-71:-
47 developing countries 5,0% 
13 African countries 2,4% 
Kenya 0,4% 
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One could continue in this vein: on the need for policies of 
regional equalisation, perhaps returning to the ILO recommendation for 
quota systems; on the need to come to grips with the land and large-farm 
issues, for example by converting single-ownerships into co-operatives 
or other forms of collective operation, or by imposing maxima on individual 
land holdings; on ways of making population policy more effective, with 
more positive leadership from the top. By culling the literature and 
personal experience, it would be a relatively easy task to draw up a fairly 
long list of specific policy recommendations. 
But this raises a basic question; is a shortage of ideas a major 
constraint on the improvement of policies or does the problem spring from 
more fundamental forces at work in the political economy? Many of the 
policy recommendations that can be inferred above are likely to adversely 
affect individuals and organisations benefiting from already existing policies. 
These are powerful agents, economically but also politically. It is there-
fore naive to propose policy changes without thinking about their accepta-
bility to those who control large political resources within the country. 
This is obvious when we talk about the taxation of wealth, land reform, 
and a shift of public resources away from the large farmers in favour of 
smallholders; it is scarcely less so in the matter of regional equalisation, 
which would involve a relative transfer of resources away from favoured 
areas towards tribal groups that have traditionally been antipathetic 
to the ruling party. For a ^lanor a policy strategy to have meaning 
there must be a firm degree of political commitment to it, otherwise it 
32 
is mere rhetoric, camouflaging the government's real intentions. The 
issue thus arises, can an effective strategy of redistribution through 
growth be thought of as reflecting political realities in Kenya? 
The improvments can be inferred from the earlier parts of 
this paper also pose another type of political-economy question, Recommend-
ations for the setting of goal prioritises,, for the judicious selection of 
multiple policy instruments to minimise goal conflicts, for more adequate 
32. Many have agreed with Waterston, (48), p. 340, that "lack 
of government support for the1' plans is the prime reason why most 
are never carried out successfully". 
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policies on technology, land tenure,, population and so on - these carry the 
implicit assumption that Kenya's political system, governmental decision-
making processes and public administration would be capable of handling these 
new demands efficiently. That is the economist's normal assumption but it 
should not go unquestioned, for it does no service to make institutionally 
impracticable recommendations. 
The final section of this paper therefore takes up these issues , to 
examine the political feasibility of improving Kenya's development strategy 
along lines already suggested and to explore the extent to which the political 
realities (interpreted broadly to refer also to institutional and administrative 
aspects) constitute aconstraint upon the improvement of policy. This is 
approached at three levels. The first is a prioristic, seeking to infer 
reasonable presumptions from the nature of the problem and Kenya's political 
system. The second looks for clues in the government's responses to the 
recommendations of the ILO report. The third approach examines certain 
decisions that have been made subsequent to publication of the 1974-78 Plan, 
in order to gauge the degree of political commitment to the strategies of the 
Plan. 
QUESTIONS OF POLITICAL-ECONOMY 
An A Prioristic Approach 
We can start with the pessimistic views expressed in Leys's review of 
the ILO report, where he castigates its authors as naive. Given that their 
recommendations would run counter to the interests of powerful groups within 
the political economy, he says:-
The obvious puzzle presented by these proposals is 
what incentive the mission thought all these groups 
- the heart and soul of the comprador alliance -
might possibly have for making such sacrifices-
(34, p. 422) 
To many that will seem an excessively negative view, for it is precisely 
one ofthe attractions of redistribution through growth, with its emphasis 
on the more equitable distribution of future increments to income, that 
it offers a strategy less likely to be fought by the rich than an alternative 
which involves reductions in the existing incomes of the wealthy and their 
transfer to the poor. (See essay by Bell in 6,) 
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In short, 'enlightened self-interest" may provide the motive 
for making sacrifices - an awareness that some concessions need to be made 
in order to avert a revolutionary situation in which all the privileges of 
the elite would be threatened. Further, we should not take for granted 
that the wealthy and powerful constitute a cohesive social class with 
identical views on where lies their self-interest. The possible emergence 
of a pro-reform coalition should not be dismissed, in which the more 'en-
lightened' members of the elite form alliances with the middle class and 
workers' and farmers' groups to implement a more effective strategy of 
redistribution through growth. Leys heavily discounts such a possibilitys™ 
'il:e mission wrote of social or political factors 
antithetical to its own proposals as 'interests' or 
'obstacles' which would have to be over-ridden or 
overcome, as if there were some further 'interest' 
independent of these and more powerful, which would 
respond to its appeal. But in fact the political power 
of the compradors, and the political impotence of the 
'working poor' and the unemployed, are equally integral 
parts of the mechanism of underdevelopment. (34, p. 424) 
Whether, as Leys implies, the distribution of political power is as skewed 
as the distribution of income, and in favour of the same groups, is a matter 
for judgement which cannot be taken much further at the a prioristic level. 
However, the following observations may bear upon the judgements we form:-
(a) Nyangira's finding that political factors were of secondary importance 
in *explaining' the geographical allocation of public resourcest 
as compared with the universal and impersonal economic forces of 
circular causation, may give some encouragement to the view that 
political power is not being used to serve exclusively the narrow 
interests of ruling groups or, if used, is not overridingly powerful. 
(b) Implementation and abuse of the Ndegwa Report recommendations (19t 
paras. 29-35) permitting civil servants to be involved in private 
business is thoroughly vicious in increasing public servants* 
identification with the interests of the wealthy elite, and r,iy 
seriously reduce the feasibility of effectuating genuine reforms, 
for reasons analogous to those given by Langdon, cited earlier. 
(c) The relative absence of a Kenyan middle class, suggested by tfta rather 
extreme polarisation in Table 1, is a factor unfavourable to the 
emergence of a pro-reform coalition. 
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(d) The decline in the influence of Parliament relative to the Cabinet 
and the civil service, the suppression of dissent in the ruling party, 
and its seemingly moribund state as a grass-roots organisation 
(underlined by the weak response to efforts to revitalise the party) , 
are liable to reduce the receptivity of the political system to moves 
for political and economic democrati s at i on, 
(e) The increasingly closed nature of the ruling elite also appears to 
reduce the prospects of democratisation and of a redistribution of 
33 resources m favour of groups largely excluded from the elite, 
(f) The sheer numbers of the very poor, the rate at which those numbers 
are growing and the likelihood that their economic plight will become 
ever more desperate in the absence of reforms, introduce dynamic 
elements into the situation which may increasingly convince those in 
power that the alternative to reform is revolution, 
(g) Future government attitudes towards progressive taxation and land 
reform are likely to provide crucial tests of the feasibility of 
reform. Given the income distribution of Table 1, adequate improve-
ments in equity would necessitate mere progressive taxation. In the 
matter of land reform, there is no question of improving the distribution 
of incremental additions because the area of land is fixed; land would 
have to be taken from large individual farmers. 
The Fate of the ILO Recommendations 
The analysis can be pursued at a rather more concrete level by studying 
the government's responses to the ILO report and drawing inferences from 
these about the possibilities of effective reform. It is possible to do this 
in a rather specific way because, to its credit, the government explicitly 
spelled out its initial responses to the ILO report in a 19 73 Sessional 
Paper on Employment (20), which in turn found some reflection in the 1974-78 
Plan, 
33, Nellis (40) gives figures for the proportion of leading posts (Ministers, 
Assistant Ministers and Permanent Secretaries) filled by members of the 
dominant ethnic group up-dated in correspondence with the author by R, 
Rasmusson as follows:-
1969 1972 1974 
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Unfortunately, a study of these documents does not point to 
encouraging conclusions, for the government's response to the ILQ proposals 
can only be characterised a§ one of dll^tjffu By this word is meant a 
tactic in which the government responds to recomme®dations by expressing 
agreement in principle but ^  uftwillit^gness to c-ofcimit itself to specific 
actions. One illustratim of this tactic ha£ already h m n provided in 
the discussion of regional policy (page .15-17/)'..In that case the Sessional 
Paper accepted the principle of regional quota? for the social Services 
but mp qlifitas wire included in tfe* Plan. 
policies toward the *«o1fct another illustration, 
'•>•:• ~ ' ^ ' ' jgk 
ari d .an important one in the context of redistribution through growth-
Aceo^-ding the Pa&d* (29,. the finds the 
tfeport to m refreshingly innovative on the subject of the informal sector 
and generally accepts its recommendations"* Yhe dhief XLO recpfcraendations 
this Subject Sipe set out in column C D of Table 3 and the specific 
reeponses of the Sessional Paper in column {?>, Despite the sympathetic 
toae.* a, process of dilution is already observable in column (2), with 
go^ rhfcNtfi* qiaalified at several points by references to the 
need t f l f e a t i b t U t j F , This process is taken a good deal further in 
Plan» whose tele-vaaat policies are summarised in column (3). Some of 
proposals siatpiy disappear (fewd Unfeasible?) or are directly con-
as with tfcfe liberal16^cion of ©jsmmercial leasing aad • 
w f e p t o of fct&iding Bandar ds. . In tfe* 
presents no systematic ^.oliqjr' m We i & f o t w i met®* at. a l l and. 
••Verfciag- i n the s&cfco-r are s t i l l subjected to oif^i-cial h«H?as^nsnt, 
atwoi^ic iUuat?fftion» of the of the SbO proposal® - • ga 
also characterise the fate o f *aict tfcruat o f th* repor t . • the main 
feature® o f the lLO's model o f development f o r the Jfeayan economy were 
<»> * f r n ^ 0» the rea l income of the v i<&Wi Kfr per cent of the popr* 
1*U0&4 (*>> ewpldfrwant tikf resources th«s release f a r S p e c i a l " invent* 
mmt e x p l i c i t l y to seduce poverty and c w a t e employment* a&4 
' Racal l that f « U) pro jected the most rapid increase 
«\ploy«ent to ocour i n the informal ui&aa sector . 
p«$>»r Ho. « o f the itt> report provides a valuable quant i f icat ion o f t h e i r 
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(c) the setting of minimum income targets. The first of these is tacitly 
rejected by the Sessional Paper's (and Plan's) failure to respond to it. 
The second is accepted only in a very weak form:-
The Government will continue to invest its resources 
in projects and programmes which provide maximum 
benefits for the poorest income group in the population. 
It should be noted that this may involve investment in 
projects which will probably bene "it other income 
groups as well. (20, p. 24) 
(Note the "continue to" and the rejection it implies of criticisms of past 
investment patterns,) The third suggestion, for the setting of minimum 
income targets, was also rejected, 
This is not to deny that some of the ILO recommendations have 
been implemented. The abolition of the gradu-.tac.personal tax, the 
imposition of duties on imported capital and intermediate goods, pro-
portionately greater allocations c " agricultural credit to co-operatives 
and smallholders, and the general thrust of incomes policies - all these 
have been in line with the ILO's proposals. Nevertheless, it was dilution 
that characterised most of the government's racoon."es a-.", ore outcome of 
this tactic was that, although the Plan was influenced in a general way by 
the ILO report, it was very unspecific when it came to targets. With the 
exception of conventional'growth targets and some rather non-operational • 
employment projections,^ the principal objectives of the Plan are not 
reduced to specifics. Target groups are not identified; income distri-
bution and anti-poverty objectives are expressed in vague terms; agri-
cultural targets provide no breakdown as between small- and large-farm 
output; industrial policies do not separately identify 'informal' processing; 
and so on. Given this lack of specificity it will, of course, be impossible 
to monitor the progress of the Plan in achieving its general goals, or to 
evaluate its effectiveness after the event. 
This description of the fate of the ILO recommendations is likely 
to be taken as a:Me justification of Leys's scepticism about the political 
realism of the ILO; certainly it provides little comfort to those who hope 
36. The employment projections on p. 4 of the Plan employ categories 
quite different from those used in the official labour statistics, making 
it impossible to employ the latter to monitor progress towards the Plan's 
targets T 
- 36 - IDS ./DP 239 
for a vigorous response by the govei rnent to the problems of equity and 
employment. A defence is possible, on the other hand, on the grounds 
that various of the key ILO proposals were simply impracticable given 
the then existing state of knowledge It is difficult to dispute the 
reasonableness of the statement in the Sessional Paper (20, p, 24-) 
that "The Government feels that it possesses neit'^ ._ sufficient information 
nor sufficient means by which it can accept as policy objectives the specific 
minimum incomes suggested in the report" - an objection that could be applied 
equally well to the suggested freeze on the top 10 per cent incomes. There 
was at the time insufficient data on the distribution of income, the incidence 
of poverty, the under-utilisation of labour, and other key variables for the 
setting of numerical targets to be meaningful. 
Moreover, there have subsequently been a number of major initiatives 
from the Central Bureau of Statistics which, if only the manpower can be 
found to analyse the data, could greatly increase our knowledge of these 
37 
problems so that at least the next Plan could be more specific- On the 
other hand, it is not clear that the impulse for these improvements came 
from the planners or their Minister, nor is it apparent that they have 
given much thought to the assimilation of the Bureau's new data into the 
general planning machinery- In fact, it seems likely that some of the 
important new information that is planned for the future will not be 
available in time to help with the preparation of the next five-year plan. 
Post-plan Decisions 
The 1374-78 Plan was largely written during 1973 and by the time of 
its publication in 19 74 much of it had been overtaken by the 'oil crisis*. 
In recognition of this radical change in the external environment and the 
consequent need to revise its own plans, the government issued Sessional 
Paper No- 4 of 1975, On Economic Prospects and Policies (22) This contains 
projections of government revenues and expenditures directly comparable with 
those presented in the Plan and thus provides a useful guide to government's 
37, . cof c "Towards a Social Perspectives a Statistical Appraisal", 
Kenya Statistical Digest, (29)- This lists a wide range of social indicators 
that already exist or are planned for the future, to be obtained from a 
national integrated sample survey- See also the Bureau's new periodical 
publication, Sociax Perspectives, the first issue of which appeared in 
June 1976, (25) 
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revealed preferences in a worsened economic situation. 
Expenditure projections are compared in Table 4, with generally 
encouraging results. One of the main depai?tUS-eS; of the Plan from the 
previous pattern of government spending was a proportionate increase in 
the allocation to agriculture and water development, at the expense of 
departments such as the Offices of the President and Vice-President, and the 
• Table 4. Projected shares of major departments in total planned government 
spending„ 
(% of total) 
Plan, 1973/74- Sessional ?ap£r 
1977/78 4/75 , 1974/75-
_ 1977/78 
1. Office of the President 3,2 3.0 
2. Vice President and Home Affairs 5,4 5.1 
3, Finance and- Planning 308 2.8 
4, DSfSM© 5.3 5.0 
5. Agriculture 8,5 11.2 
6. Water Development 3,8 5.4 
7. Health 6,8 6,6 
8. Works - 12,8 • 11.7 
9. Lands and Settlement 2.5 1.9 
10, Education 20,4 " 19,8 
11, All other departments 27,5 27.5 
12, TOTAL 100.0 100,0 
of whichi-
13, Re current 67,3 ' 66,0 
14, Capital 32,7 34,0 
(Note: Major spending departments are defined as those responsible for 2,5 
per cent or more of total projected expenditures in the Plan (recurrent 
and capital), 
Sources: 21, tables 7,3, 7.5 and 7.7, 
22, tables 2, 3 and 
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3 8 Ministry of Works, Table 4 reveals a reinforcement of these changed 
priorities, with further increases in the shares of agriculture and water 
development, at the expense of various other departments including those 
just mentioned. This comparison thus provides some reassurance of political 
commitment to the spending priorities in the Plan (a commitment further 
confirmed in the 1976 budget estimates), although difficulties were being 
39 
experienced in translating these priorities into practice and sceptics 
may add that these changing priorities are at least partially a reflection 
of changing patterns of external aid availabilities. 
Table 5 presents a similar comparison for the composition of govern-
ment revenues. The results in this case are unfortunately much less encouraging. 
Table 5. Projected, composition of government current revenues, 1974/75 to 
1977/78, 
(-6 of total) 
Plan Sessional Paper 
4/75 
1. Company income tax 12,4 16.8 
2. Personal income tax 15.5 6.7 
3. Sales tax 12.2 21.5 
4. Excise taxes 9.5 8.0 
5 . Import duties 18,3 21.1 
6 . Appropriations-in-aid 10,4 8.3 
7. Other and unidentified 21.7 17,6 
8. TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
Note: (a) The title given to this item in the Plan is "Income Tax - other"^ 
and in the Sessional Paner "Income and other taxes on households". 
The figures may thus not be completely comparable, although 
examination of detailed revenue data suggests that discrepancies 
between the "two itemisations can only be minor. 
Sources: 21, table 7,2; 
22, table 5, 
38. See Plan, (21),table 7,4, Note that the figures in table 7.4 
are not directly comparable with those in my table 4, 
39. The Plan Implementation Report, 1973/74, (23), tables lb and lc 
show that agriculture under-spent in 19 73/74 whereas there was substantial 
over-spending by the Office of the President, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
and the Ministry of Health. 
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The chief changes revealed in this table are a massive proportionate shift 
away from personal income taxation and an almost exactly equal rise in the 
proportion of revenue to be raised by the sales tax. Given the reasonable^ 
if tentative presumption that, at the upper end of the income scale, the 
income tax is more progressive than the sales tax, and the comments earlier 
(page 13 ) about the lack of progressivity in the tax structure, the revealed 
shift in planned revenues must be greeted with dismay by those looking for 
redistribution through reform, A major change appears to have occurred 
on taxation policy between the publication of the two documents, but it is 
a change that is not spelled out in the Sessional Paper, This further 
undermines whatever substance might have underlain the statement in the Plan 
:that "the better-off members of the community will contribute proportionately 
mere to Government revenue through taxation".40 In this respect, then, a 
weak degree of government commitment is revealed. 
Conclusion 
— , -—The conclusions-drawn from the considerations presented in this 
section are necessarily judgemental, Neither the logic of the situation 
Dor the evidence point uniformly to an unambiguous conclusion; there is 
ample scope for alternative interpretations. Nevertheless, it would be 
an evasion to deny that, on balance, the main burden of this section has 
emphasised the essentially negative influence of Kenyan political realities 
as- constraints on the implementation of a strengthened strategy of redistri-
bution through growth. There is certainly scope for some improvement. It 
should be possible, for example, to strengthen population policies without 
falling foul of vested interests (although the strongly ethnic character of 
Kenyan politics militates against reduced fertility). Nevertheless, 
it seems likely that many of the changes suggested in the section on impli-
cations for future planning may not be politically feasible at present, for 
a. pro-reform coalition has yet to reveal itself within the government. There 
The fate of the capital gains tax announced in the 1975 budget 
and justified on equity grounds is also revealing. For in response to 
complaints the Minister of Finance nade provisions for tax relief and 
other concessions along lines suggested by the business community. (See 
Walker, ( 4 7 a n d Weekly Review, 24 May 1976.) In consequence, the Treasury 
no longer expects this tax to yield more than small amounts of revenue s 
rendering it irrelevant to the distribution of income and wealth. In 
fact, the 1976/77 budget estimates make no provision at all for receipts 
from this tax. 
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are also many who complain that a ma.aise has fallen upon the government's 
economic decision-making processes, making it difficult to effect improve-
. 4 ^  merits even if the will were there 0 
Meanwhile, the problems addressed by redistribution through growth 
remain, omnipresent and worsening, It is thus not the essential desirability 
of the strategy that is called into question but the possibility of achieving 
adequate reforms within existing economic and political structures. Time 
is not on the side of those who, like the present writer, would seek a 
reformist solution. 
4-1. One of the necessarily few public expressions of this complaint is 
provided by Judith Heyer 
It is the Ministry of Finance and Planning and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, but not the President's Office, that pushes rural 
development. There is no initiative coming from the high-level 
political organs.... Another-factor which militates against 
optimism about the agricultural sector is the inertia -of the 
bureaucracy, the difficulties in getting changes in things like 
the extension service and the administrative services that reach 
the rural areas. The agricultural extension service is crucial, 
as is the administration. Many of its problems are now recognised, 
but it is almost impossible to do anything about getting things 
changed,... Machinery is clogged up, bureaucracies are unable to 
cope, and everything is slowing down, (10, p, 30) 
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